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Papua New Guiuea  (PNG)  faces substantial exposure to price  fluctuations of its  major primary
commodity  exports. Existing  commodity  risk management  schemes provide  limited protection against the impact
of commodity  price fluctuations,  have high cost, and are not able to provide protection over long time periods.
(e.g., the agricultural stabilization funds are effectively  exhausted).
This paper shows that financial  instruments available  in developed capital markets are better suited to
manage the external risk of PNG than existing  schemes, and are less costly. This is especially  true for mineral
and energy price risks  where financial  instruments exist  for hedging over long maturities. This paper shows  how
these instruments could be used by PNG.  For the agricultural stabilization funds, short-term hedging tools
could be used effectively,  and, for illustration, a simple hedging strategy is developed for the coffee fund,
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the importance of primary commodities to PNG is
discussed, as well as its exposure to volatile international commodity  prices.  In section 3, existing commodity
risk management mechanisms are discussed, and in section 4, the exposure of economic stability to  past
commodity price fluctuations is quantified. In section 5, a general overview  of risk management schemes and
their costs and benefits is presented, and section 6 discusses  some specific financial instruments applicable to
PNG for  external risk management.  Risk management strategies for the mineral and energy sectors are
developed in section 7, and for the agricultural stabilization funds in section 8.  Conclusions of the study are
drawn in section 9.
2.  Backaround: Importance of External Risk Management to the PNG Econom!
This section describes why external risk management is of primary importancc to the PNG economy.
First,  PNG  is  highly dependent  on  the  cxports of primary commodities for  forcign cxchange carnings,
govcrnmcnt revenues, and employmcnt.  Second, PNG is a  price takcr in the world markcLs  of its major
primary commodity cxports. During the 1970s  and 1980s  period thcsc markets have bccn highly volatilc,  with2
large intra-year and inter-year fluctuations  in prices, and thus a major source of instability  in the PNG economy.
Third, PNG's debt structure exposes it to both exchange rate and interest rate  risks. Therefore, the use of
commodity,  interest rate, and currency  risk management instruments would  be of considerable  value by reducing
these exposures.
2.1.  Motane  of Primary CoModities  to the PNG Econom
The performance of the PNG economy  is determined largeiy  by the strength of the export sector which
is composed mainly of mineral and treecrop exports (see also Table 2.1). These are crucial to the economy
in  terms of  foreign  exchange earnings, government revenues, employment, and  external debt  servicing.
However, agricultural production is the major source of employment in PNG.  Within this sector, coffee and
logs dominate, with the importance  of cocoa, copra and cocc.nut  oil, and palm oil declining  since the mid-1980s.
Thbe  importance of primary commodities  in export earnings is illustrated in Table 2.1.  In 1989,  almost
70% of the total export earnings of PNG were obtained from the exports of gold and copper compared with
less than 50% in 1985. It is projected that the mineral sector will continue to dominate in the early 1990s,
contributing a little less than two-thirds of total export earnings in the 1990-1992  period.  Outside the mineral
sector, logs and coffee contribute the most to export earnings. In 1989,  coffee and logs contributed 10.9% and
6.6%, respectively,  with cocoa and palm oil at 3% to 4% and copra 1.4%. These proportions are forecast to
remain fairly stable in the early 1990s  period.
The minerals sector makes a large contribution to governmcnt revenues through corporation income
taxcs, dividend  withholding  taxes, and dividends  from government  equity in mineral prcjects.  In addition, there
are the import duties and payroll taxes paid by the mining corporations.  In total the mineral sector providcd
20% of govcrnment revenues in 1989,  and by the end of the decade their share is forecast to rise to over 35%.3
Tabl  2.1.  Contnbuion  of Maior Primary  PgmModiyEWs  to Total Emrt  pamin.NG.  t.
Commodity  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Percent
Minerals  46S  60.9  61.7  70.6  69.0  6S5  64.1  64.7
Gold  25A  402  413  36.4  25.1  31.2  34.3  40.1
Copper  21.1  20.7  20.2  34.2  43.9  34.3  29.8  24.6
Nonmintemls  535  39.1  383  29A  31.0  345  3S.9  353
Cocoa  75  63  5.3  35  3.8  3.2  2.6  2.6
Coffee  13.4  IS4  16S  9.4  10.9  9.2  7.2  6.9
Copra  5.1  2.0  1.0  1.3  1A  135  IA  1.2
LOP  7.7  5.7  6.9  7.6  6.6  8.9  10.1  9.6
Palm  Oil  73  3.9  2.8  1.7  3.1  4.3  5A  S.6
Other  12.3  5.8  S.8  5.9  5.2  7.4  12.2  9.4
Source: Based  on Table H in Annex Vil of IMP,  1990.
Although less important than the mineral sector, the agricultural  sector makes a significant  contnibution
to government revenues though direct taxation of company income, taxes on agricultural exports, and profits
from government equity in agricultural  projects (e.g, oil palm estates).  In addition, there are the indirect taxes
imposed on imported agricultural  inputs, as weil as the taxes paid by individuals  earning agricultural incomes,
and the excise  taxes levied  on items such as fuel, beer, and cigarettes purchased with incomes generated from
agriculture. It is estimated, for example that the contribution  to total government  revenues of the coffee  sector
alone is as much as 10% (see Brogan and Rewenyi (forthcoming)).
The mining sector generates few opportunities for employment in PNG.  Most of the capital used in
the  mines is technologically  advanced and is imported.  The two major mines, BCL and OTML, together
cmploy about only 6,000 people (many of whom are expatriates) which is about 0.3% of thc labor force. The
labor force in PNG (estimated to be 1.8 million in 1987) is primarily employed in agriculturc.  Within the
formal sector, agriculture is the most important source of cmployment, taking about 20% of the labor forcc.
Whilc the terms of trade havc movcd against the agricultural  exports of PNG sincc the mid-1960s,  rcal4
consumption  and investment  have  been maintained  by overseas  borrowing. As a result, cxternal  debt has
increased  dramatically  from less  than $200  per capita  in 1970  to more  than $1,200  currently. The debt service
to exports  ratio is currently  at about  30%. In the 1988  government  budget,  and interest paymtents  alone  made
up almost  7% of total expenditures.  External  debt (servicing)  has further been influenced  by two external
factors: intermational  interest rates and cross-currency  exchange  rates. The influence  of movements  in
international  interest  rates  on PNG's  debt service  obligations  has been  relatively  small  compared  to many  other
developing  countries,  since  a considerable  part of PNG"s  long-term  debt is  of a fixed  rate nature (approximately
45 percent).  Still,  a change  of one percentage  point  in the interest  rate alters  debt service  by about  $13  miUion.
The influence  of exchange  rate movements  on the level  of ntebt  measured  in US dollars  has been large since
a significant  part of PNG's debt is in non-dollar  currencies  (approximately  60 percent).  Over the period 1985
to 1989  the absolute  value  of the currency  valuation  effect  on debt stock  has,  on average,  been  about  $72  million
annually  or about 3 percent  of the debt stock  (see also the Appendix).
2.2 Nature  of Primaa Commodity _alue  Eluctation
The instabilily  of export revenues  of primary  commodities  is associated  with fluctuations  in both
quantities  produced  and prices. Indexes  of the value,  volume  and unit  value  of the major  primary  commoditics
of PNG between  1985  and 1989  and projections  for 1990  to 1992  are reported  in Table 2.2. Also  reported in
Table 2.2 are the coefficients  of variation  (CV)  (the ratio of standard  deviation  to the mean)  which  provide  a
crude  measure  of instability.
The CV for the index  of the  value  of mineral  exports  for the 1985-1992  period  is almost  20%,  indicating
that cxport  value  is quitc unstable.  The  value  of copper  exports  is espccially  variable  with  a CV  of 36.5%,  while
the CV of gold was  19.0%. Also,  copper  prices  werc highly  unstable,  recording  a CV  of 24.4%. The index  of
the value of nonmincral  exports  was more stable than the mineral  index,  with a CV of 14.4%. The most
important  commodities--logs  and coffcc--reported  CVs of 20.6%  and  34.5%, rcspectively,  which  arc both lowerS
than  the CVs  for the other  major  commodity  exports,  except  for gold.
Ta  le  2.2  P-n  Mew  -uinea: -zMEW  Value. Volume.  and  Unait  Value,  b  Maie  CommOdity.  19951992
Commodly  1985  1986  1987  1998  1989  1990"  199177 199277  C$'1
YAks
Minerals  68  9S  86  131  128  100  96  111  19.3
Gold  78  132  122  141  98  100  108  14S  19.0
Copper  S9  62  54  121  156  100  8S  so  36.5
Nonminerals  152  124  109  109  116  100  96  107  14.4
Cocoa  229  20S  1SS  134  148  100  81  94  345
Coffee  139  169  164  123  144  100  77  84  26.3
Copra  327  133  67  104  117  100  91  91  59.9
Logs  83  65  71  116  90  100  111  121  20.6
Palm Oil  167  93  S8  47  88  100  122  143  37.2
Volume
Minerals  81  11S  104  136  118  100  108  129  14S
Gold  72  125  115  124  102  100  110  149  188
COpper  90  1OS  94  146  133  100  106  110  16.4
Nonminerals  82  83  86  91  92  100  100  106  8.9
cocoa  83  82  80  78  115  100  92  103  111
Coffee  68  64  76  87  87  100  87  90  13.7
Copra  135  IS0  131  117  104  100  88  89  17.9
LOP  87  90  93  114  95  100  112  lS  11.0
Palm Oil  70  78  72  48  76  100  118  129  29.3
Uoint  Value
Minerals  84  83  83  96  108  100  89  86  95
Gold  108  106  106  114  96  100  98  97  5.6
Copper  66  59  57  83  117  100  80  73  24.4
Nonminerals  185  149  127  120  126  100  96  101  22.3
cocoa  276  250  194  172  129  100  88  91  39.9
Coffee  204  264  216  141  166  100  89  93  38.1
Copra  242  89  51  89  113  100  103  103  47.7
Lop  95  72  76  102  95  100  99  103  11.9
Palm Oil  239  119  81  98  116  100  103  111  38.0
Source:  Based  on Table  iii in Annex VII of IMF, 1990.
I/  Projections.
2/ Coctficient of Variation.
With thc cxccpzion  of gold and logs, thc unit value variability  of each export  commodity in the table6
is greater than its production variability. This reflects the high degree of instability  of intcrnational agricultural
commodities  prices.  Also of interest is the fact that the commodity  unit values have declined over the period,
especially  for coffeeand cocoa.
The dependence of PNG on primary commodities  will be strengthened with expected developments in
the energy sector.  Oil export earnings could amount to as much as one-third of mineral export earnings by the
year 2000, equivalent to 25% of total export earnings.  With greater dependence on oil cxports the economy
of PNG will open itself to risks associated with fluctuating  oil prices.  Recent events have been a reminder that
oil prices are highly  unpredictable which suggests that risk management instruments to lower these risk will be
of great importa-ice in the future .
2.3  Probems Created by Cmm-odity and Other Price Instability
The  previous section clearly demonstrates that commodity price, exchange rate  and  interest rate
instability has had and will continue to have major impacts on PNG's macroeconom; through its cash-flow
effects on export earnings and the relative burden of debt service.  The impact of volatile external prices does
not, however, limit itself to its contemporaneous effect on  cash-flows  but also impacts on production and
investment decisions.  For PNG, the problems involved  in developing  the non-mining sector of the economy
can, in part, be traced back to the large dependence on mineral exports and the volatility  in mineral prices. In
times of high mineral prices and high real exchange  rates, the international competitiveness  of the non-mining
sector deteriorates and little investment  occurs. However,  in periods when mineral prices and the real exchange
rate fall, the non-mining sector may still not develop, as investors realize the situation can casily revcrse itself
in the future, rendering investments  in the non-mining sector possibly  unprofitable.
Ilistorically, the CV of oil prices has bccn  hctwcen  20%  and 30%.7
3.  Exslin CommadiAisk  Mananemet Mechaisms
In this section the linkages  between  the commodity  sectors and other sectors of the economy  are
explored  in greater detail and a description  of the important  institutions  and mechanisms  through which
commodity  prices  affect  the economy  is provided.  There  are three main  entities  which  bear  the risks  associated
with  fluctuating  commodity prices.  These are (i) the Government  of PNG (GOPNG); (U) the private
corporations  that operate in these  sectors;  and (iii) the agricultural  marketing  boards for coffee,  cocoa,  copra,
and palm oiL  We discuss  the allocation  of mineral  and energy  price risks  first, followed  by agricultural  price
risks,  and the specific  risk management  schemes  in place  in each sector.
3.1. Minera and E  Price  Risk
The GOPNG  is affected  by price changes  in tdie  form  of tax revenues  channeled  through  the Mineral
Resource  Stabilization  Fund (MRSF),  and through  the,  Mineral  Resource  Development  Corporation  (MRDC)
(through  its equity  stak.  n mines  and energy  projects  and its responsibility  for raising  the necessary  funds  to
rinance  the equity  participation  in new projects).
3.1.1. Taxation  and
The structure  of mineral  resource  taxation  in PNG reflects the authorities'  objective  of providing
adequate  incentives  to producers  while  ensuring  that the government  is able to secure  most of any windfall
profits (see further Coopers and Lybrand  (1989)).  The tax regime in place for both the mining and the
pctrolcum projects places a  heavy  tax burden on the more profitable  operations while minimizing  tax
requirements  from marginal  projects. Mining  cnterprises  arc subject  to an effectivc  tax rate of 46%. Highly
profitable  operations  are subject  to an additional  profits  tax (APT),  which  can  result  in marginal  rates  of a;;nost
65%. The mining  APT is payable  when  the project  shows  a return on investmcnt  abovc  a specificed  rate. As
a  result of the APT, the government's  revenues  increascs  sharply in periods of high commodity  prices.8
Petroleum projects are subject a company tax rate of 5;9%. The APT for the petrel'  -um .ndustry is payable at
a rate of 50% once the project has achieved a 27% nominal rate of return after income tax.
The Mineral Resource Stabilization  Fund (MRSF) was established by an A.., of Parliament in 1974,
with the objective of reducing the impact of fluctuations  in mineral revenues or. the government budget.
Under this legislation,  all dividends  in state shareholdings, companv income taxes, and dividend withholding
taxes (identified above) from all designated mining operations must be paid into the MRSF. The assets of the
MRSF are held by the Central Banik  of PNG (BPNG) which invests  them in securities  abroad, primarily in the
form of interest-bearing deposits and central bank securities.  The surplus funds, managed BPNG, constitute the
main source of reserves.
Drawdowns from the MRSF are determined on i;-  basis of recommendations  submitted to the Board
of Management of the MRSP. The general rule for withdrawal  is that the amount to be drawn down should
ensure that the Fund is sustainable in terms of real purchasing power over the next five years (see also Guest
(1987)). The Board of the MRSF is bound to make forecasts of future receipts for eight years ahead and
(implicitly)  for inflation forecasts for five years ahead. The commodity  prices implicit in tke forecasts should
not vary more than  10 percent from the historical moving-average  of commodity prices (20 years for copper
prices, the preceding year for gold and silver).
In practice there has been considerable  flexibility  in the operation of the MRSF and a revision made
to the MRSF Act in 1987  allows  the government  greater discretion than before.  This, while providing greater
flexibility  in the use of mineral revenues, carries the risk of larger increases being allowed in drawdowns  and
expenditures in anticipation of future growth in these revenues.  The contributions to and drawdowns  from the
MRSF have varied substantially  over the past decadc. The degree of stabilization  the MRSF has provided can
be quantified by comparing the Cv  of its outflows  over the pcriod 1980-1988  (45%) with the CV of revcnues
(56%).  This suggcsts that very  little stabilization  of the government's  budget has taken place by placing MRSF9
between  tax receipts  and inflows  in the budget:  only  a relative  reduction  of about 20%2. The result is to be
expecced  given  the implicit  use of the moving  avera2-e  price with short time periods (one year for gold and
silver)  as an indicator  of the future  price and the (recent)  flexibility  in the rules.
3.1X  Min:rp1Kesources  l)pnentCorporation  (MRDC)  Ruiles
The govermment  has followed  a policy  of taking  an equity  share in all major  mineral  projects.  Although
these investments  have  been characterized  by a high degree of risk, there has been popular  support  for the
principle  that the government  should  maintain  a share in the ownership  and control  of projects  involved  in
exploiting  nonrenewable  resources. The equity-participation  in new  mineral  projects  has taken  place lusing  the
MRDC as a vehicle. In the case of mining  projects,  the govermment  has reserved  the right  to take an equity
share ok  tip to 30%, although  in most projects  to date it has taken a 20% share. The expectation  is that, in
some form or another,  the state, provinces  and landowners  will,  through  MRDC,  retain an equity  stake in the
mining  projects.  For petroleum  projects,  the government  reserves  the right  to take d  22.5%  carried  interest.
MRDC  has financed  its equity  participation  in the different  projects  in a variety  of ways  from deferred
payback  on future dividends--in  which  case the foreign  investors  effectively  provides  the financing--to  loans
obtained  through  external  commercial  borrowing  (with  a government  guarantee) 3. More re ently,  MRDC has
relied on foreign financing. MRDC receives  their dividends  on its equity stake and pays any excess of dividends
over financing  costs  to the r[FP. Through  its participation,  MRDC is exposed  to commodity  price risk since
its expenses  (interest  and principal  payments  on foreign  loans)  are not dependent  on commodity  prices  whereas
its rcvcnucs are. The substantial level of government  equity  in new mines ^nvisaged  over the next few  years will
This result is conflrmcd by the analysis of Guest,  which dcrivcs thc similar result  that the NIRSI has  reduced the instability of
mineral revenues by only 30 percent.
31'frcctively, the Departmcnt of Financc and Planning  (DI')  has arrangcd the financing  under its nanc  and thcn passcd  it on to
%IRDC.10
require large amounts of new financing, (commercial  external borrowings) which arc estimatcd to amount  to
about $500 million in 1991 and 1992.  This will greatly increase MRDC's exposure.
3.2.  Prinate Corrations
Foreign companies operating mines in PNG are exposed to commodity  price risks through thc impact
of price changes on the cash-flow derived from the mines (dividend remittances and other transler  payments
to the parent company). Most foreign  firms have put in place some risk management program to protect cash-
flow streams to parents against commodity  price swings.  It a-ioears,  however, that the risk manage:mnit is dlone
at the parent, off-shore level, i.e. net profit remittances received by the parent from the subsidiary are hcdlged
at the off-shore level, leaving export receipt and taxes exposed.  This implies that much of the commodity  price
exposure remains  at  the  subsidiary level and  consequently that  the  PNG  economy remains  ecposed to
fluctuations in the price of its main exports.
33. Abr,icultural  Commodity  Boards
Given  the  importance of  agricultural commodity exports  to  the  economy and  the  volatility of
international prices, stabilization schemes have been established in PNG since the 1940s for the  impor.iant
export crops in Papua New Guinea (PNG) -- namely cocoa, coffee, copra and palm oil. The four schlciiems  zirc
similar in design (see Figure 1).  A threshold pr;ie is determined equal to a ten-year moving  averate  1 F(F)l
prices, adjusted for inflation.  Then a buffer zone is set at 5% above and below the thrcshold price in wvhich
no bounties or levies apply. When the current FOB price is more than 5% above the threshold price, levies
are imposed on producers at 50% of the difference between the threshold price and the current FOB pricc.
The levy  revenues are paid into a commodity  stabilization  fund. When the current FOB price is more than 5"s,
below the threshold price, bounties are paid to growers at 50% of the difference between thc curreint  I01)B  prrice
and the threshold price.  Bounties are paid out of the stabilization  fund.11
price/ton/
Farner
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Figure I
Until recently, the schemes were successful  in stabilizing producer prices.  Howcvcr, in ilic midl- aInd
late-1980s,  commodity  prices fell in real terms, so that current FOB priccs were consistently  below thc tlhrcslold
price.  As a result, subsidy payments were made to growers over an extended period.  This lcd to thc eventual
exhaustion of the cocoa, copra and palm oil funds, and the coffee fund is expected to run out carly in 1991.
To prolong price support, the funds were kept solvent through government financial  contributions, commiiier-ciall
bank loans and STABEX transfers.
In response to these problems, in November 1989 the government decided to implement it number  of
interim measures which would  provide support to the agricultural  export sectors while a new approach to pricc
stabilization  was found.  The objective of these new measures is to give price protection to growers while thiv
adjust to  lower international prices without the  support of bounty payments from the  stabilization funds.
Instead of establishing  a threshold price based on a long-run moving average, support durinig  the atlisltlllct
pcriod is based on the difference between the estimated costs of production and the international price.  T'h.
level of price support will decline over an adjustment period of about three to five years dcpendiing  on  ihc
commodity. By the end of this period producers will face international priccs. The loans used to finanec  pricc
support payments are to be repaid by the commodity  boards from cxport rcvenues when the international pl ice
exceeds the support price.12
The  rationale for  this policy is that  without such a  scheme  agricultural incomes would decline
substantially  with a significant proportion of the estatc sector going out of business. With support, as well as
initiatives  to improve  productivity,  such as extension  and research, the sectors will be able to adjust to low prices
and to gain international competitiveness,  as well as being in a position to repay existing  loans.
4.  Impact of Commodity  Price Fluctuations on Economic Stability in PN(G
In this section we provide empirical  estimates of the magnitude by which each institution is affccted by
commodity price risk. We identify  the following  parties: tax revenues, MRSF, MRDC, and the private sector.
4.1  Tax Revenues
Historically,  PNG's total tax revenues have been very sensitive  to variations in commodity prices. This
can be estimated by running the regression:
(1)  t  a  + ,Pt 1 + -YPt 2 + ... + error
where TRt are percent changes in tax revenues in period t, and Pt, are percent changes in the prices of relevant
commodities (e.g., copper and gold) 4. From these regression cquations, the clasticity of tax revenues with
respect to the copper price (both expressed in percentage annual changes of dollar values) over the period 1976-
1988  was about 0.25 (with a t-statistic of 3.3 and a R2 of 0.56). The clasticity  with respect to gold prices was
about 0.18 over the same period, but not significant. A similar regrcssion was done for export earnings. Thc
elasticity  of export earnings with respect to copper prices was about (1.18  (with a t-statistic of 1.37 and a R2 (if
"Scc  further G(emmill  (1985) and Kolb (1985)  on how to cslimnatc  thcsc sensitIvifics.13
0.135).  The elasticity  with respect to gold prices was about 0.738 over the same period (t=2.84, R2 =  .45)5.
These results suggest that the exposure of tax revenues to export prices is quite different from the
relationship between export earnings and export prices in the case of the gold price, but similar in the case of
the copper price. Since the average share of copper and gold in export earnings over the 1976-1988  period was
about 25% and 30% respectively,  these elasticities  indicate also that movements  in volumes cxported have partly
offset the effects of price movements in the case of copper exports and exacerbated those movements in the
case of gold exports.
42  MRSF
Similar regressions  were performed for the dividend  stream on the government's share in the mining
projects accruing to MRSF. The elasticity  for gold was 1.22 (R2 = 0.28,  t = 2.06) and for copper 0.72 (R2 =
0.05, t= 0.77).  The regression coefficients  for the annual levels  of dolar  dividends  (in millions)  on the level of
prices for the period 1981-1988  were 0.076 for gold (RG =  .43, t=2.14) and 0.005631  for copper (R2 =  .42,
t=2.11).  Since the last regression is in levels, the coefficients  measure the exposure of the dividend  stream to
prices and can be interpreted as the quantity of physical  commodities  'received' by the government each year.
These quantities are equal to 2.56 tons of gold (converting ounces to tons) and 5,631 tons of copper (or 8
percent of gold exports and 2.5 percent of copper exports).
Regarding future price sensitivities,  the World Bank (1989)  reports results for two scenarios: in scenario
I the price of gold is 15% lower than in the base case and the price of oil stagnates in rcal terms; in scenario
2 the price of gold rises proportional to international inflation.  The diffecrcnce  in thc currcnt account between
thcse two scenarios is 7.5 percent of GDP and in the fiscal balance is 6.7 perccnt of GD?, indicating thc largc
scnsitivity  of both aggregates to international commodity pricc movements.
' Ovcr  a longcr  period  the  elasticity  of cxport  earnings  with respect  to copper  priecs  is  0.54  (with a t-statistic  of 2.97),  and the  clasticitv
with respect  to gold prices  is  0.64  (with a t-statistic  of 2.11).14
43  MlDQCadlhe  Private  ScLtor
Sensitivity  scenaros regarding future prices can also be performed on the profitability  and resulting  tax
revenues in the case of an individual  mining operation. This was done for a mine similar to the recently opened
Porgera mine, which largely  produces gold.  Based on production estimates, costs of production, and current
tax regulations profits, tax receipts and  dividends paid abroad (the excess cash-flow after subtracting the
government's share) are calcuated under different gold price assumptions.
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Figure 2 plots the results for the present value of dividends  paid abroad and the present value of gross
receipts  to MRSF (tax receipts, royalties and dividends)  over the life time of the project. As one can observe,
the prcsent value of MRSF receipts, PVT, is more sensitive  with  respect to the gold price than the prescnt value
of dividends paid abroad, PVD. As the gold price increases, the APT comes into cffcct and raises the PVT
rclatively  morc than the PVD.  In rcgrcssing the PVT on the gold price, the slope is around two, while thc
slope of a regression of the PVD on the gold pricc is only  0.75.  Tlhus,  the govcrnment  is rclatively  (about thrcc
times) morc cxposed  to gold price risks than the forcign investors arc, since ilicy share less in the upside of15
a price increase while the government  shares more because of the APT 6.
5.  Risk Management Schemes and Their Costs and Benefits
The above section indicated the need for risk management, especially  commodity risk management.
There are many different forms of commodity  risk management that can be used by developing  countries. We
will discuss here the ones in use by PNG.
5.1  Stabilization Funds
The principle behind the agricultural product stabilization  funds and MRSF in PNG is that in periods
of decline in commodity-related tax revenues the government draws on  its reserves to finance its normal
expenditures. The experience  with commodity  stabilization  funds in other countries has shown, however,  that
these funds are seldom sufficient  to sustain expenditures in times of prolonged downturns in commodity  prices
and that consequently the funds only insure against short-lived and temporary declines in commodity prices
(Gilbert (1990)). Evidence of this is provided by the agricultural stabilization schemes which are effectively
depleted.
The PNG agricultural  stabilization  schemes were designed originally  to stabilize price around the long-
run average price.  The non-stationarity  of commodity prices means that use of the moving-average  of past
prices is unreliable as an estimate of the long-run price, and that the scheme is likely to fail.  As reported
above, the agricultural  stabilization  funds in PNG have indeed become exhausted following  the persistently low
prices of cocoa, coffee, copra and palm oil during the late 1980s. Thcre are many similar cxamples from other
countries (e.g., coffee and  cocoa stabilization funds in Cote d'lvoirc and Cameroon).  MRSF is the onlv
stabilization  fund in PNG that has so far performcd successfully  for a prolonged period.  The recent closure
of BCL has shown that cvcn the MRSF can only provide vcry limited insurance against a major shortfall in
6In terns  of Icvcls. the  cocfficicnt  for  PVD  is about  $80,000  for  the govcrnmcnt's  sharc.16
government revenues and that additional support for PNG's balance of payments has becn necessary.
Adjusting the rules of a scheme will not prevent the funds from exhaustion  over the long-run, unless
the effectiveness  of the scheme in stabilizing  prices is drastically reduced.  For example, using historical data
it can be shown that if the moving average period were to be shortened and the inflation adjustment were
eliminated from the PNG agricultural schemes, the funds would not now be exhausted.  However, while such
changes would certainly  reduce the frequency of depletion of the stabilization funds, the trade-off is that the
price paid to producers would be less stabilized.  Another modification to the design of the schemes which
would  slow the exhaustion  of the funds would be to allow only  50% of the fund be paid out as bounties in any
one year.  In this case the fund would never become exhausted (although it could asymptotically  decline to
zero), but it would become progressively  weaker in its ability to stabilize producer prices.
The agricultural schemes in PNG have failed largely  because of the difficulty  of determining the long-
term price which in turn determines the level of withdrawals. Funds in other countries have failed for this
reason but also because of lack of discipline  in accumulating  reserves in times of high commodity price. The
increased flexibility  with respect to drawdowns from the MRSF thus raises some concerns with respect to
budgetary discipline.
5.2  Other Instruments
PNG has also benefitted of the international commodity  agreements for cocoa and coffee. Most of the
international price stabilization  schemes have collapsed  in recent years because of a breakdown in cooperation
among  its members  or because  of the  exhaustion of  support  funds. PNG  has  also  drawn funds from
compcnsatory  financing schemes (such as STABEX/SYSMIN facilities, and CCFF), which can serve as risk
managemeni schemes.  However, they have the drawback of their limited and uncertain availability,  as was
shown following  the reccnt closure of the Bougainville  copper and gold mine (BCL).17
6  Financial Instruments to Manage External Risk
The failure of the international commodity  agreements to stabilize prices on a reliable basis and the
possible drawbacks of compensatory  agreements and domestic stabilization schemes point to the importancc
of financial  market instruments for commodity  price risk management purposes. The most important financial
instruments from PNG's point of view are  commodity futures, commodity options, commodity swaps and
commodity-linked  fnance (loans and bonds) (Masuoka (1990)). More specifically,  forward contracts, futures
contracts and options could be used to eliminate price exposure over a short time period (e.g., one year) for
the agricultural commodities. Swaps  could be used in the mineral and energy sector for longer horizons. The
nature and usage of these short- and long-term hedging instruments in the context of PNG is now further
described.
6.1  Commodity  Futures
As an example, the Cocoa Marketing Board in PNG may wish to set a guaranteed price to producers
for the coming season without incurring significant financial losses if international prices change suddenly.
Based on historical export patterns, the Cocoa Board could predict fairly accurately the quantities of cocoa
available for export during different months throughout the year.  Then it could sell futures contracts at the
beginning of the season for each of the delivery months in the  coming year in proportion to  the volume
available  for export in each of those months. The guaranteed price at the beginning  of the season to producers
could be set as the weighted average of the futures prices (with weights given by the export volume).  As
exports are sold at  international prices throughout the year, near-by futures contracts (i.e., those closest to
expiration) could be purchased (thus offsetting the original short position) at prices close to the international
price.  Such a strategy would eliminate intra-year price risk for the Marketing Board.18
6.2  Commodity  Options
Commodity  options (on futures contracts) could also be used by the commodity  boards.  For example,
say the Coffee Marketing Board wished to hedge the future price of its coffee sales with options instead of
using futures or forward contracts. Suppose the Board wished to scll 50,000  tons of coffee in six months timne
and wants to receivc a price of at least $2,000  per ton.  In this situation, the Board purchases put optiorns  giving
it the right to sell coffee futures contracts at a price of $2,000  per ton.  Say the premium quoted is $50 per ton
so that $2.5 million is p2id to cover the entire 50,000  tons.  If after 6 months the price is greater than $2,000
per ton, say at $2,200  per ton, the Board would not exercise the options and receives $110 million  in revenues.
If, however, the price falls to $1,800 per ton, the Board will exercise its options, enabling it to sell futures
contracts at $2,000  per ton.  The futures contracts can then be bought back at $1,800  (since the spot and futures
prices are always  equal at the expiration  of the contract) making a profit of $200  per ton.  The Board then sells
the coffee at the spot price of $1,800  per ton.  Combining the $200 per ton gain on the futures contracts and
$1,800  per ton on the physical  commodity  gives an overall price of $2,000 per ton and total revenues of $100
million.  The coffee options provide price insurance to the Board, guaranteeing it at least $100 million in
revenues in exchange for an insurance premium of $2.5 million.
6.3  Commodity  Swaps
Assume that PNG and a big German company agree upon a long-term export contract in which the
German company buys  2 million  pounds of copper every six months over the next five years and pays the then
current copper price at each six-month interval.  Assume also that the PNG exporter wants to "lock-in"  the
dollar value of thcse revenues now. The exporter now enters into a commodity  swap contract with a U.S.  bank.
Assumc that the term for the swap is  $1/lb. (indicative).  The U.S. bank agrecs to pay the exporter U.S. $2
million cvcry six months for the next 5 years.  The exportcr agrecs to pay thc value at the spot price of 2
million pounds of copper on the same dates when the bank is duie  to make its payment--in  effect a "diffcrcnce"19
check settles  the transaction  each 6 months. Thus, the commodity  swap  contract  is, in cffect,  a series of 10
forwari contracts  lined  up over the next  5 years  and has locked  the price at $1/lb.
PNG has sufficient  access to private  financial  markets  to be able to use any of these financ  al risk
management  techniques.  Given the increase  in exposure  of the PNG economy  to commodity  price risk, the
economy  will increasingly  depend on a  handful  of commodity  exports for its growth and development.
Therefore,  commodity  risk management  should  become  an integral  part of the GOPNG's  economic  strategy.
We discuss  in the next  two sections  some possible  ftnancial  risk management  techniques  for the mineral  and
energy  and agricultural  stabilization  funds  respectively.  However, PNG will  need to establish  first a proper
institutional  framework  and overall  strategy  and  acquire  training.  Only  then  specific  risk  management  operations
can be implemented.
Since  PNG is not only exposed  to commodity  price risks,  but also to other forms of external  risks
arising  from  its financial  liabilities  and assets  (i.e.,  exchange  rates  and interest  rates),  it is furthermore  important
that the links  between  different  exposures  are taken  into account.  The interactions  between  the different  forms
of external  risks which  need to be taken into account  are the following.  First, movements  in cross-currency
exchanges  rates may offset (or exacetbate)  movements  in primary  commodity  prices,  implying  that both
commodity  and exchange  rate management  may need to be modified.  Second, there can be an inverse
relationship  between  commodity  prices  and quantities  traded.  Depending  on the elasticity  of supply  and demand,
the effect  of price changes  on export  revenues  or import  expenses  can be offset  by changes  in the quantity  of
goods  exported  or imported.  This may  reduce  the need for hedging  price risks  as a way  to hedge  revenue  or
expensc  risks  (Coleman  and Qian (1991)).
7.  Mineral and Encrgy Price Risk Managcmcnt Stratcgics
As discussed  above, the MRDC docs not insulate thc governmcnt  budget from Ilic risks associatcd with
commodity priccs because MRDC's liabilities  (loans) and assets (dividend streams) arc not matched.  This is20
because its obligations on exdermal  loans (debt service payments) are independcnt of commodity prices while
its dividends are highly dependent on commodity prices.  A matching between assets and liabilities over the
long-term can be made with either a commodity swap or commodity-linked  finance.
An example is when MRDC has an equity stake in a  copper mine. In that  case, its revenues are
sensitive  to the copper price and a copper swap can be used to convert copper-price sensitive  cash-flows  into
a certain cash-flow  stream which can be used to service obligations on conventional  loans. As mentioned by
Masuoka (1990), this structure was successfuUly  used in the case of the Mexicana de Cobre copper mining
company.
The notional amount of copper swap would depend on the sensitivity  of the dividend stream to the
copper price. Based on our earlier analysis,  the annual value of dividends  (and thus MRDC's revenues) can be
expressed as:
(2)  Dt = a  + ,Pt
where D is the value of dividends  and P is the copper price. Graphically  this is shown in figure 3.
In section 4, B  was estimated to be about 5,631  tons. This implies that for every one dollar change in
the price per ton of copper, MRDC's annual revenues change by approximately  $5,631. This is equivalent to
MRDC receiving  (having  a long position  of  5,631  tons of copper annually,  since  the value of owning 5,631  tons
of copper would change by an equal amount as a result of a price change.
This long position of the MRDC in copper can now be hedged by a commodity  swap. The swap would
oblige PNG to pay annually the spot value of 5,631 tons (P*$P 1,  which is about $15 million dollars at  the
current spot copper price) in cxchange for a fixed payment received.  The tixed payment would depJ,nd on
conditions in the market for copper-swaps  and on the futures prices for copper, but for iltistrative purposes
a Fixed  price of $2,500/ton can he uscd.  The coppcr-price  sensitive  dividend  stream will tlien be matched with21
the  copper-price sensitive obligation on  the swap.
The net result will be a cash-flow stream which is
(1argely) independent of copper  price  swings and  °t
which would thus, without any risk, be available to
service conventional loans.
Commodity-linked loans  can  achieve the
same result. Consider the case of the participation  of
MRDC  in  a  gold-mine, (e.g.  a  mine  similar to  I  n,^:  t
Porgera).  Once the project comes on stream, the
Figure 3
dividend payments received by MRDC will depend
on the price of gold. It was shown above that for every dollar change in the price of gold, the present value
of a  dividend  stream to MRDC coming from a project like Porgera changes by approximately  $80,000,  or,
equivalently,  the annual dividend  stream changes by about $8,ooo7. In order to hedge this risk, the financing
of the equity-participation  by MRDC should consist of an obligation  whose servicing  also changes by $8,000  for
each dollar change in the price of gold and for the remainder of a conventional loan. A gold-loan could
constitute the price sensitive  part. Gold-loans stipulate payments in terms of ounces of gold and the costs of
servicing  the gold loan would thus vary  one-to-one with the price of gold. In every period, MRDC would want
to owe 8,000  ounces of gold, since this obligation  would  vary in the same way as the dividend  stream with gold
price changes.
Currently, gold interest rates  (gold fees) are between 2% and 3%, so  that MRDC could borrow
betwecn 250,000  and 400,000  ounces of gold. At currcnt gold prices, this means MRDC could obtain betwecn
$100 million and  $150 million dollars in  a  gold loan. The  rcmainder would havc to  be borrowed in  a
'Notice that we measure  here thc  sensitivity  of thc present  value  of dividend  strcams  and not thc annu;al  dividend  streams.  Thc
prcsent  value  of all future dividcnds  will be more  sensitive  to assumptions  about  thc futurc the gold pricc than the annual  sircams.
Approximately,  thc diffcrcnce  will be the factor  1/(discount  rate).22
conventional dollar loans.  The combination of the gold-denominated and  the vonvcntional  loans would
perfectly hedge MRDC.
Similar rinancial hedging tcchniques are  possible for MRSF. The current investment policy for the
reserves of the MRSF is that they are invested  by the Ccntral Bank in rclatively  low-yielding,  safe assets. This
policy does not seem to provide PNG with the best mix of return maximization  and risk minimization. Even
though using foreign exchange reserves provides a smoothing mechanism, it does not involve laying  off risks
to other parties and is an expensive  self-insurance  scheme, because the fund's asset returns are unrelated to
commodity price movements and because it cannot sustain a prolonged decline in commodity prices. Further,
the fund tes  up a significant amount of foreign reserves.
A better reserve management policy  would  be to manage reserves through commodity  loans, commodity
swaps, or short-term commodity hedging tools.  Commodity  swaps are the most suitable. Based on projected
revenucs streams that depend on the price of a particular commodity,  MRSF could enter a commodity swap
with a foreign frinancial  institution (altogether MRSF should eventually  enter several swaps, i.e. separate ones
for gold, copper, and oil).
As an example, consider MRSF's gold-dependent revenues. MRSF received K42.5 million in total
revenues in 1988. Based on the production numbers of BCL and on prevailing  gold and copper prices, it is
estimated that revenues related to gold-mining  amounted to about 30 % of total revenues or 12.4 million Kina
(or $14 million)  in 1988. This revenue stream depends on the gold price and is equivalent to MRSF holding
a long position in physical  quantities of gold. Using the 1988  gold price, this long position in tax revenues was
equal to about 33,300  ounces of gold. Thus, for every dollar increase in gold price, annual tax revenues of the
8 9lowever,  since thc gold loan is likely to bc in exccss  of  MRIC's  financing necds. thc rcmnaindcr  could hc invested in convcntional
sccuritics.23
MRSF  change  by about $33,000,  or the change  in the value  of 33,000  ounces  of gold9.
6MRSP  could  now  enter a gold  swap  with a foreigm  financial  intermediary  with  an interest payment  of
33,000  ounces  of gold (based on a spot price of 425 S/ounce  with a notional  interest  payment  of $14  million)
in which  it would  effectively  sell  gold at a fixed  price  for, say,  the next  10 years.  The ngjQnnlprincipal  amount
would  depend  on the current market  gold fee; at a rate of 2% it would  amount  to about 1,650,000  ounces  or
about  $700  million 10.
In this way,  MRSF  pays  the third party  at certain  times  the equivalent  value  of 33,000  ounces  of gold
at the then prevailing  spot price--which  exactly  offsets  the tax and dividend  receipts  it gets from the gold
producer.  In exchange,  it receives  from the third earty  (commercial  bank) a fixed  payment  of $X times  33,000
at each date (where  X depends  on the gold fee, the current  spot price of gold and the current  interest rate),
and MRSFs tax revenues  for the next 10  years are effectively  fixed  at $X times  33,000.
Swap  transactions  will  not result  in a perfect  hedge  since  MRSF  revenues  do not depend  linearly  on
the underlying  price of the commodity,  but the revenues  depend  in a non-linear  way  on commodity  prices  and
go up progressively  when commodity  prices  rise.  Considering  the gold sector only, the dependence  of the
revenues  paid  into MRSF  can be represented  as: 11
(3)  Rt = a  + pQ9max[Pt-F-O + AQ*max[Pt-M,O0
where Rt is the revenue  going  to MRSF,  P is the effective  corporate tax (the combination  of the regular
91he carlier  analysis  of the gold mine  indicated  that the regression  coefficient  of the net  present  value  of taxes  (NPT) on the gold
price  was  about  2.  This result  is confirmned  in a regression  of the  tax revenues  paid into MRSP  on gold  prices  which  has  a slope  of about
0.23.  Sincc  N'P1  is the discounted  value  of all future taxes,  it  will be more  sensitive  to the gold price by approximattly  the factor
1/(discount  rate),  or about 10.
'0Notc that the notional  principal  amount  is never  cxchanged  between  the two parties.  l.ffectively  only  intcrcst  payment  are  settled
on a nctting  out basis.
1tTbis example  concerns  the revenucs  after depreciati3n  allowances  have  expired  and the  procct gencrates  a positive  profit.24
corporate tax rate (currently 35%) and the withholding  tax (17%), making for an effective  tax of 46%), 0  is
the quantity exported, F is the fixed  costs per unit for the producer (including depreciation allowances in the
early years of the project), P 1 is the gold price, and A is the APT tax rate which comes into effect when profits
exceed a benchmark, which is assumed to occur when prices P, exceed the level M.
This exposure of revenues to gold prices can be hedged using swap transactions (as outlined above)
combined  with long-dated options.  Once the company  has largely  depreciated its fixed  costs, i.e. F = 0, the swap
transaction would involve  a (notional) amount of gold equal to P*Q which would hedge revenues on account
of the regular profit part. This would result in more stable streams to the general budget.  In addition to the
swap, MRSF could sell today a series of long-dated call-options to a third party with exercise prices of M, for
amounts equal to AQ and with maturities on which tax receipts are due in future years. The sale of the call
options would  give PNG a premium income today. This premium could be invested in safe foreign obligations
(e.g. commercial bank deposits or Treasury bills or bonds), from which an annuity could be passed on to the
general government budget.
The gold swap would now hedge the normal corporate and dividend  withholding tax revenues, and
paymnents  on the swap will be matched with tax receipts at each maturity date.  The options would hedge the
APT. At the maturity date of the option, the commodity  price could either be below the level M (at which the
APT is not in cffect) or above it. When it is below,  the call is also out-of-the-money  and MRSF would not be
required to make payments to the third party. When the call is in the money, the paymncnt  on the call will
cxactly be offset by the tax revenue to  the MIPSF from the APT. Again, the transaction would result in
converting  a risky tax revenuc income stream into a ccrtain yield on the invested premium.  These transactions
arc shown in Figurc 4. It is clear that the nct payoff thcre is almost indcpcndent of the price of gold as it is
horizontal for almost all price ranges.
The transactions result in MRSF largelv locking  in its revenics over a long period independent of thc
gold price. It also allows the MRSF to pass on a fixed  stream of payments to the general budget, and not to25
Hedging  Taxes  Using  Swap  and  Option
ProfIt  at  $400,  APT  at  $650
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rely on formulas based on expected prices or ad-hoc decision making.
The use of short-term commodity  hedging  instruments would  be similar to that of swaps. An example
using commodity futures to hedge carrent year tax revenues against copper price risks would be the following.
At the beginning of the fiscal year, PNG would sell copper futures contracts with maturities spread out over
the year.  The amount to be sold would depend on the sensitivity  of the tax revenues to copper prices. The
carlier analysis showed that this elasticity  was about 0.25, implying  that PNG would have to sell futures with
a contractual face value cqual to about 25% of anticipated tax rcvenucs.  This would  cffcctivcly  reduce as much
as possible the combined effcct of price and quantity unccrtainty on next pcriod tax rcvenue unccrtainty.26
8.  AgiQltural  Sabilionu
In the description of the fiancial  instruments by Masuoka (1990) it was indicated that for  most
agricultural commodities the  longer term  hedping instruments were  not  yet well developed. For  these
commodities, however, the short term hedging instruments are in general easily available.  Since the  four
agricultural  stabilization  funds have very similar  main features, we will develop  below a hedging strategy for the
Coffee Marketing Board using coffee futures traded in New York.
While the prime objective of the coffee fund is to reduce the effects of sharply changing prices over
time, substantial problems can be associated  with sudden price movements  within  the year. This was illustrated
very recently  with the breakdown  in the International Coffee  Agreement, leading to coffee prices declining  from
$3,356  per ton in January 1989  to $1,515  per ton in December.  The largest month!y decline  was between June
and July, with price falling  from $2,762  per ton to $1,942  per ton, a reduction of 30%.
Intra-year price risks can be hedged using futures contracts. A possible hedging strategy would work
as follows. The Coffee Marketing Board offers producers a price for coffee which is fixed for the entire year.
This price is set at the beginning of the year and is equal to the weighted sum of the prices of coffee futures
contracts which will mature at various months throughout the coming year. The weights  are determined by the
quantities of coffee available  for export in the months between each contract expiration.
For example, say in December 1988  the Coffee Board had wished to set a fLxed  price for the crop year
1989.  There  are  five expiration months on  coffee futures contracts (March, May, July, September  and
December) and in December 1988  each had a price for delivery  in these months in 1989. Based on historical
cxport trcnds the Board could have predicted fairly  well  the proportion of the total exports available  before each
of these delivery  months (e.g., January, February and March 10%; April and May 20%; June and July, 30%;
August and September 25%; October, Novcmber and Deccmbcr 15%).  These proportions could have then
been used to obtain a weighted price for the coming year.
This strategy  was simulated  using monthly  data from 1980  to 1989  and the cffect  on intra-year variability27
observed by comparing the CVs of various price series.  The results are reported in Table 8.1. for the world
price, the threshold price (ten-year moving  average), the domestic price A (the threshold price adjusted for
subsidies and  levies calculated using the world price), the fixed price (the weighted futurcs price) and the
domestic price B (the threshold price adjusted for subsidies and levies calculated  using the fixed price, instead
of the world price, and assuming that the price band followed  the moving average).
-abl 8.J Intra-Year Meie Yariability 1921149.  (CVsA
Year  World  Threshold  Domestic  Fixed  Domestic
Pnce  Price  Price A  Price  Price B
1980  16.8  2.9  8.9  0.0  1.1
1981  6.2  2.0  4.1  0.0  1.0
1982  4.2  2.0  1.6  0.0  0.0
1983  5.5  1A  4.7  0.0  0.0
1984  2.7  1.6  1.9  0.0  0.0
1985  11.2  IS  7.4  0.0  0.7
1986  16.7  1.2  9.7  0.0  0.6
1987  83  2.5  3.9  0.0  0.0
1988  2.9  OS  2.5  0.0  0.2
1989  30.4  IA  16.0  0.0  0.7
Mean  10S  1.7  6.1  0.0  0.4
The inter-year CV of the world price is substantial, averaging 10.5% over the ten-year period.  The
instability  in 1989  is clearly  captured by the CV statistic,  which reached 30.4% for that year. The domestic  price
A (based on the world price) also fluctuated throughout the period. The results showed that under the existing
scheme the greater the intra-year variability  of the world price, the greater it was for the domestic price for
produccrs (e.g., in 1980,  1985,  1986  and 1989),  even with subsidies and levies. In contrast, by using the futures
contract to  lock-in an external price, the inter-year fluctuations in the  domcstic price are removed almost
altogethcr.  On average, the CV of the adjusted domestic price is 0.4%, indicating  that produccrs are almost
entircly insulatcd from intra-ycar price instability. The impact of opcrating this hedging strategy on intcr-vear
price variability  is reported in Table 8.2.28
Tabl2  AeracE PIcesfor Stabilized  Coffee  Pre  In pNO  Us Dolams.
Year  Wodd  Threshold  Domestic  Fund  Fixed  Domestic  Fund
Price  Price  Pice  nsize  Pri  price  size
1980  3466  2444  2953  68  4106  3273  73
1981  2869  2640  2749  82  2754  2697  95
1982  3088  2840  2964  87  2733  2733  96
1983  2911  3009  2898  89  2788  2788  96
1984  3189  3173  3157  91  3033  3033  97
1985  3231  3355  3203  91  2951  2985  96
1986  4295  3541  3897  104  3939  3740  100
1987  2S05  3421  2792  101  2792  3278  105
1988  3013  3257  3019  90  2926  2930  10S
1989  2387  3212  2684  85  2691  2791  101
Mean  3095  3089  3031  89  3120  302S  90
Std. Dev.  504.1  334.9  328.7  9.4  481.6  308.6  9.6
CV  16.2  10.8  103  10.6  H5A  10.2  8.9
The results show that the introduction  of the hedging  program has very  little impact  of inter-year
variability  compared  to the stabilization  fund. On average,  the domestic  price  A (based on the world price)
is $3,031  per ton, compared  to $3,025  per ton for domestic  price  B (based on the fixed  price). The stability
of these prices  was  similar  with coefficients  of variation  of 10.8%  and 10.2%,  respectively.  The impact  of the
hedging  strategy  on the fund size is also shown  in Table 8. 2.  On average  the mean of the fund with the
hedging  strategy  is larger  than that without  it, while  the  variability  of the fund  is lower. This reflects  the lower
CV of the fixed  price  compared  to the world  price.
This analysis  shows  that with  a simple  hedging  strategy  using  futures  contracts  the Coffee  Board can
rix  the cxtcrnal  price it faces  for an entire year at a time. This stability  can be translated  into a very  stable
within-year  domestic  prices received  by producers. The clfcct of implemcnting  this strategy  on intcr-year
variability  is  vcry  small,  however.  Futures  with  longer  maturities  or rolling  over  futures  may  be used  to managc
this inter-year  price risks.29
9.  Cmdushb
This  paper diswsed some  of the financial  instruments  available  to PNG for managing  its external  risks
and illustrated  their potential  benefits. Given  the importance  and benefits  of risk management,  PNG should
consider  undertaking  a risk management  program.  This  could  involve  establishing  a national  financing  and risk
management  strategy  (authorized  perhaps  by PNG's  National  Borrowing  Advisory  Committce). Furthermore,
the MRDC  needs  to be strengthened  by establishing  rules  regarding  not only  the size  of its participation  in ncw
projects,  but also the type  of external  rnancing  it uses (e.g.,  more commodity  indexing  features)  and its risk
management  strategy.
In the past, the MRSF  has been  well  managed  given  the financial  tools available.  Howcvcr,  the MRSF
should  now  take advantage  of the recent  innovations  in international  capital  markets  by using  instrunlenis  stic  h
as commodity  swaps  to hedge  its commodity  price-sensitive  tax revenues.  This would  allow  stablc cash-llows
to be passed  on to the general  budget,  independent  of commodity  price movements.  Other comnmioodity  risk
management  techniques  can also be introduced  in managing  the MRSP.
With the expected  expansion  of the mineral  and energy  sector,  PNG should  look for ways  to rcduce
the variability  of its economy  through  fmancial  instruments,  and, given  its high international  credit standing,  is
well  placed  to take advantage  of longer-term  commodity-linked  instruments.30
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Debt  Rntigp  szm ~rggno  C0Mggsitioin  0f  PNG
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
PRlWCZPL  RATI03
Total  £xternal  Debt  (I)
EDT/XGS  66.1  121.9  175.9  195.9  197.3  203.0  168.2  158.5  130.5  161.5
EDT/GNP  29.2  49.1  72.3  77.0  81.7  90.5  77.6  77.0  66.5  74.2
TDS/ MS  13.8  19.0  25.1  30.1  40.1  32.7  26.8  24.6  26.6  34.3
IHTMX0S  8.6  10.0  12.7  13.8  15.8  13.5  11.3  11.1  10.0  11.2
INT/GNP  2.9  4.0  5.7  5.4  6.6  6.0  5.3  5.4  5.1  5.1
Cancessional/EDT  12.2  9.7  8.6  12.0  14.0  16.3  20.4  24.1  19.3  19.1
1980  1981  1982  1963  1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989
CURMBWC'Y  CCFEOSITrON  OF DEBT OUTSTANDINO  (PFfCERI)
U.8.Dollcrs  35.0  27.9  39.0  48.4  45.5  39.0  35.7  29.2  28.9  31.9
Mixed  Currency  27.4  41.3  36.2  31.1  29.0  28.9  28.0  27.6  29.9  31.0
Japanese  Yen  4.4  3.7  3.4  3.0  8.4  14.2  16.1  18.0  20.8  23.0
Deutsche  Mark  5.2  3.9  3.1  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.3  1.8  1.8
French  Franc  .0  .0  .0  .0  .2  .4  ,3  .3  .3  .2
Pound  Sterling  2.7  2.3  2.4  1.7  1.2  1.3  1.9  2.1  2.0  1.5
Swiss  Franc  25.  4.5  3.4  2.5  4.2  7.2  9.5  10.3  9.6  6.1
Other  Currencies  19.6  16.4  12.4  13.4  11.7  9.4  9.0  13.3  10.2  9.6
Exchoane  Rate  Val  Effects  /a  0  -12  -20  -13  -20  40  87  140  -44  -50
Notes:  a/  IDP.  debt  valuation  effects  are  shown  from  1985  onward,  millions  of  dollars.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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